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Hume's Penguin, or,
Yochai Benkler and the Nature
of Peer Production
Steven A. Hetcher*

ABSTRACT

This Article examines 'peer production," a term coined and a
concept explicated by Yochai Benkler. My own interest in peer
production stems from its importance as a new form of user-generated
content. User-generatedcontent is particularly interestingif Benkler is
right in his claim that the positive analysis of peer-produced content
may have normative implications with respect to copyright law-in
particular,the implication that copyright law may play a deleterious
role in the formation and maintenance of this potentially significant
new form of user-generated content. We are in need of a theory of
collective action for the social world that is emerging in cyberspace.
Benkler's theory of peer production makes an important contribution to
this project. The present Article seeks to expand on Benkler's account
by demonstrating that collective-action problems are not synonymous
with the tragedy of the commons. In particular,one important type of
solution to a collective-action problem of a sort not countenanced by
Benkler is the convention or coordinationnorm. This Article will show
that not only would a more comprehensive theory of collective action in
cyberspace need to fit conventions into its account but also that even
Benkler's examples of peer production must take account of conventions
as well.
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There is no account at all in the legal literature about the relationship between
technology and collective action.
-Beth Simone Noveck 1

This Article examines "peer production," a term coined and a
concept explicated by Yochai Benkler-a leading Internet theorist-in
an important and widely read article. 2 My own interest in peer
production stems from its importance as a new form of user-generated
content (UGC). 3 Peer production is interesting in its own terms, but
particularly so if Benkler is right in his claim that the positive
analysis of peer-produced content may have normative implications
with respect to copyright law-in particular, the implication that
copyright law may play a deleterious role in the formation and
maintenance of this potentially significant new form of UGC. Before
examining Benkler's account in greater detail, I will set the stage by
briefly considering the varying roles that copyright law plays with
respect to other forms of UGC.

Beth Simone Noveck, Democracy-The Video Game, in THE STATE OF PLAY:
1.
LAw, GAMES, AND VIRTUAL WORLDS 258 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds.,
2006).
Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112
2.
YALE L.J. 369 (2002).
For a definition of user-generated content, see Steven Hetcher, User-Generated
3.
Content and the Futureof Copyright:Part One-Investiture of Ownership, 10 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 863, 870-71 (2007) [hereinafter Hetcher, User-GeneratedContent].
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UGC is exploding, 4 a dramatic development that cuts to the
core of copyright law. The reason is simple: by the orthodox account,
the U.S. system justifies copyright law in instrumental terms rather
than with a recognition of fundamental rights possessed by creators in
their works. 5 This means that rights afforded to creators under
copyright law are justified only as long as they continue to serve the
goals of copyright, which, at least on the hegemonic, economic account,
is to incentivize the production of creative works. 6 What is earth
shattering about UGC from this perspective is that because it is
produced by literally millions of ordinary people, apparently without
any expectation of economic gain, the very rationale for providing
copyright protection to this growing body of creators and their works
is called into question. 7
Notwithstanding this question of the
necessity of copyright protection for UGC, the fact is that currently
these works are indeed protected under copyright law.
Thus,
copyright necessarily plays a role, but interestingly, a novel one with
respect to UGC. Moreover, that role varies depending on the type of
UGC at issue.
For example, UGC creators who upload original content to
Facebook do not do so because they are motivated by the potential
rewards promised by copyright law. Pursuant to the Terms of Service
that these users agree to, Facebook takes a license in the users'
creative works. 8 It is this license that allows Facebook to function;
otherwise potential competitors could create mirror sites and
Facebook would lose its exclusive control over this content. The result
would be no copyright protection for users' creations, no licenses for
Facebook, and thus no Facebook. We see, then, that copyright law
plays an essential role in the production of the creative content found
on Facebook, albeit indirectly, incentivizing the Internet intermediary
rather than creators themselves.
4.
See Matthew Mirapaul, Why Just Listen to Pop When You Can Mix Your Own?,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 2001, at E2. ("In postmodern culture, in which existing elements are
routinely cut, pasted and blended into new works, computers are providing handy tools for
these transformations, and the Internet is supplying an eager audience for the results.").
Like amateur musicians who produce derivative musical works, amateur authors maintain
hundreds of literary "fan fiction" websites, publishing stories about popular characters
from television shows like Star Trek and The West Wing. Id.
5.
Harper Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 580 (1985)
("Congress thus seeks to define the rights included in copyright so as to serve the public
welfare and not necessarily so as to maximize an author's control over his or her product.").
6.
See Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); Bond v.
Blum, 317 F.3d 385, 393 (4th Cir. 2003).
7.
Hetcher, User-Generated Content, supra note 3, at 875-76.
8.
See Terms of Use - Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/terms.php (last visited
Mar. 20, 2009).
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Similarly with another important category of UGC-fan fiction
and remix works-copyright does not play the role of motivating
creation.
With exceptions at the margin, these works are
overwhelmingly produced with no expectation of economic gain.9 Once
again, whereas we might at first assume otherwise, copyright law
actually plays a complex and significant role in bringing about these
works-and indeed, one of the contours of this role is still evolving and
in dispute. 10 For example, instead of incentivizing the production of
this category of UGC, copyright law sometimes does exactly the
opposite. Because fan fiction and remix works build upon preexisting
commercial works, typically without authorization, these latter works
are potentially subject to infringement liability." Not surprisingly,
creators of fan fiction and remix sometimes live in fear that their
creations will cause them to be sued. 12 This is bound to have, as the
phrase goes, a "chilling effect" on these creators. 13 In this respect,
copyright law disincentivizes this type of production. While the extent
to which potential creators are deterred is an empirical question in
need of research, one straightforward economic implication is that
raising the cost of creation via credible threats of legal action will
reduce the level of such activity at the margin.
Yet, because much work of this sort is fair use, one might
suppose that the threat of infringement liability, and thus its chilling
effect, would be marginal in practice. 14 But as the Lenz v. Universal
case demonstrates, 15 the fact that a remix use is fair will not
necessarily deter the owner of the underlying work from invoking
copyright law in order to curtail use of that work. The court's decision
in Lenz promises to make the role of copyright even more complex, as
the court held that owners seeking to invoke the notice and takedown
provisions in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) must
See, e.g., Rebecca Tushnet, Legal Fictions: Copyright, Fan Fiction, and a New
9.
Common Law, 17 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.REV. 651, 657 (1997) ('"The ethos of fandom is one of
community, of shared journeys to understanding and enjoyment . .

.

. Fans also see

themselves as guardians of the texts they love, purer than the owners in some ways
because they seek no profit.") [hereinafter Tushnet, Legal Fictions].
HENRY JENKINS, CONVERGENCE CULTURE, 142-45 (2008); see generally Lenz v.
10.
Univ. Music Group, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (N.D. Cal. 2008).
On remix generally, see LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND
11.
COMMERCE THRIVE IN THE HYBRID ECONOMY (2008); on fan fiction generally, see Tushnet,

Legal Fictions,supra note 9.
12.
See, e.g., Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150 (involving issuance of a takedown notice
regarding a video of a YouTube member's child dancing to a Prince song).
Steven A. Hetcher, Using Social Norms to Regulate Fan Fiction and Remix
13.
Culture, U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009) [hereinafter Hetcher, Using Social Norms].
14.
Id.
15.
Lenz, 572 F. Supp. 2d 1150.
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make a good faith representation that the use in question is not a fair
use. 16 Thus, instead of simplifying the connection between copyright
and remix, fair use doctrine, combined with the DMCA, has added an
additional layer of complexity to the relationship.
The general lesson to be drawn from these examples is that
while UGC may lack the typical and paradigmatic relationship
between creative works and copyright law, it nevertheless still has
interesting connections that vary depending on the type of UGC at
issue. As the following discussion will bear out, the relationship
between UGC and copyright law only becomes more complex and
interesting when we closely examine the UGC that results from peer
production.
At this early stage of our understanding of this extraordinarily
fecund new source of creativity, it is useful to work out these
divergences in different types of UGC as a step toward a more general
theory of UGC and its relationship to copyright law. The proceeding
discussion is an effort in this direction. It will follow Benkler's
conceptual framework, which is to engage primarily in positive
analysis and only later give a preliminary indication of normative
issues raised, or implications suggested, in light of that positive
analysis. 17 This is not meant as an indication of the relative
unimportance of the normative analysis, but rather just the opposite.
Because the potential normative concerns that may be raised are of
such a significant magnitude-in particular, calling into question the
very existence of copyright protection with respect to the domain of
UGC-they merit extended treatment of a sort that will best be
pursued only after the positive issues are more clearly understood.
. I. BENKLER'S ACCOUNT

The distinctive feature of peer production is that it does not
involve individuals or small groups working over a defined period of
time. Instead, peer-produced content is the result of the combined
efforts of large numbers of "peers"-that is, ordinary volunteers whose

16.
Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 512(o (2000); Lenz, 572 F. Supp.
2d at 1154-55.
17.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 399.

What remains is the interesting and difficult task of explaining the phenomenon
so as to begin to think about the policy implications of the emergence of this
strange breed in the middle of our information economy. I will by no stretch of
the imagination claim to have completed this task in the following pages, but I
hope to identify some basic regularities and organizing conceptions that will be
useful to anyone interested in pursuing the answer.
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efforts "produce" something that continues to grow and evolve over
time.1 8 Another feature of peer production is that it is significantly
enabled by emerging technologies. 19 For Benkler, the ambit of peer
production extends beyond the world of copyrightable content, as
Benkler counts, for example, the combined efforts of the thousands of
amateur volunteers who have helped analyze data to more accurately
map the craters of Mars, searching for alien life. 20 With all due
respect to Mulder and Scully, in the present context the focus is not on
Benkler's broader concept of peer production, per se, but instead on
production that makes use of, or adds to the sum total of,
copyrightable content. This divergence notwithstanding, Benkler's
article demonstrates a great interest in, and has much to say with
respect to, creativity and culture-two topics of overarching interest to

copyright law.

21

18.
Benkler does not define "peer." The term has a certain connotation in ordinary
language that he would probably not disavow, and indeed would likely welcome as
applicable in the context in which he uses it. The notion of peers evokes a certain sense of
equality. Equality in the context of peer production is instantiated in the sense that such
productions result from a horizontally structured, informal labor force rather than a
formal, legal, and hierarchical one. Benkler, supra note 2 at 375 ("The phenomenon of
large- and medium-scale collaborations among individuals that are organized without
markets or managerial hierarchies is emerging everywhere in the information and cultural
production system."). Despite his claim to be doing positive theory, Benkler makes
normatively loaded comments, such as characterizing peer production as having a
democratic component. Id. at nn.36, 42 & 43 (describing the structure of various peer
productions as "democratic"). One might question whether the Wikipedia production
process is as non-hierarchical as Benkler suggests. Posting of Eric Goldman (Wikipedia
Law
Blog,
&
Marketing
to
Technology
Fail in
Four Years)
Will
http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2006/12/wikipedia_willl.htm (Dec. 5, 2006, 14:01).
Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of
19.
Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003) (discussing the economic and technological
developments that have led to the current state of peer production).
20.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 374.
21.
Id. at 377.
The advantages of peer production are, then, improved identification and
allocation of human creativity. These advantages appear to have become salient,
because human creativity itself has become salient. In the domain of information
and culture, production generally comprises the combination of preexisting
information/cultural inputs, human creativity, and the physical capital necessary
to (1) fix ideas and human utterances in media capable of storing and
communicating them and (2) transmit them. Existing information and culture
are a public good in the strict economic sense of being nonrival.
Id. at 377 n.16
While the reference to information as a public good is common, the reference to
culture is not. I have no intention to go into subtle definitions of culture here,
though I tend to follow the approach offered in J.M. Balkin, Cultural Software
(1998), by thinking of culture as a framework for comprehension. By "culture" I
mean a set of representations, conceptions, interpretations, knowledge of social
behavior patterns, etc., whose particular application to reducing uncertainty for
human action is too remote to be called "information," but which is indispensable
to the way we make sense of the world. "Cultural production" as I use it here can
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A. Examples of Peer Production
Benkler considers open-source software and GNU/Linux in
particular to be his paradigm case 2 2 due to its phenomenal success. 23
It is also an important case because of its arguable political
implications. When people have talked about the democratization of
content production, they have typically emphasized the fact that the
makeup of the content is not dictated by a small group that will have
an undue influence on culture. 24 There is a different sort of political
implication in as much as free software is self-consciously meant to
weaken the monopoly position of major software venders-Microsoft,
in particular. This is political for those who seek to displace the
importance of Microsoft software, viewing Microsoft as a danger to
basic democratic values such as free speech and autonomy. 25
Another important example for Benkler is Wikipedia. 26 A few
factors make Wikipedia of such great interest. One is the manner in
which it is produced and maintained: mainly by volunteers making
piecemeal contributions, adding to and subtracting from the former
contributions of others. Another factor that makes Wikipedia so
important is that it is wildly successful in the sense that it is used
be done by parents, teachers, Hollywood, Mozart, the Pope, peer groups, and the

guys playing guitars in Washington Square Park. Defined as a set of conceptions
and their representations and as sets of behavioral instructions, its economic
character is similar to ideas or information. Obviously, embodiments of culture,
like a specific statue or building, are no more nonrival than embodiments of any
other form of information, like a book or a corkscrew.
Id. at 377 n.16.

22.
Id. at 371-72 ("The emergence of free software and the phenomenal success of
its flagships-the GNU/Linux operating system, the Apache web server, Perl, sendmail,
BIND-and many other projects should force us to take a second look at the dominant
paradigm we hold about productivity.").
23.
Id. at 440.

24.
JENKINS, supra note 10, at 3 (noting the cultural shift towards consumers as
producers rather than the segregation of those roles).
25.

YOCHAi BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS 434-47 (Yale University Press

2006) (describing Microsoft's attempt to maintain control over the web browser market and
noting how free software like the Mozilla web browser presents a serious problem for
"anyone who seeks to constrain the range of uses made of the Internet").
26.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 386-87. Contributors to Wikipedia sign away any
copyright interest they might possess in their contribution. Wikipedia: Copyrights Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wikilWikipedia:Copyrights (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
See id. Wikipedia is a not-for-profit foundation and it would appear necessary that
contributors release any copyright interest. Otherwise it would be unable to function, as
edits to entries could not occur without the permission of the array of contributors. See id.
Wikipedia's founder, Jimmy Wales, has gone on to create a for-profit wiki: Wikia. Tdim
McNichol, Building a Wiki World, BUS. 2.0 MAG., Apr. 3, 2007, available at
http://money.cnn.com/magazineslbusiness2/business2
_archive/2007/03/01/8401010/index.htm.
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every day by millions of people. In addition, it is broadly used for
educational purposes, one of copyright's preferred categories. 27 Given
that one of the goals-and on some accounts, the goal-of copyright is
to promote social welfare, it is sensible that the fact that Wikipedia is
so fecund in this regard would entitle it to the large amount of
attention it has received from the public. It strengthens Benkler's
argument to focus on a type of content that is highly valuable and
widely desirable, thus comparable to the best of commercial content
and yet produced in an alternative manner-democratically and for
free. The more socially valuable and widely used the peer productions
that Benkler discusses are, the stronger his argument is that peer
production is an important compliment to other modes of production.
Other examples that he discusses in some detail include
Slashdot, a peer-reviewed online publication of commentary on
technology and culture; more efficient directories for the web, made up
of contributions from the public; 28 and even multiplayer games like
Ultima Online and EverQuest.2 9 It is not clear at this point what other
works would potentially fit Benkler's model. Some commentators
have expressed great optimism with respect to the general sorts of
peer production Benkler has in mind. 30 While overall an optimist with
regard to the possibilities of the peer model of production, Benkler is
somewhat more cautious. He questions the likelihood of, for instance,
peer production novels, although he does hedge his bets, remarking
that novels "that look like our current conception of a novel . . . are
31
likely to prove resistant to peer production."
Even if Benkler's model of peer production is flawed in certain
respects, it is nevertheless of great interest, given the significant
examples he discusses. Some commentators have, however, called
Eric
into question the long-term viability of these innovations.
Goldman, for example, has predicted the demise of Wikipedia by
2010.32 As Benkler notes, others have questioned the long-term
17 U.S.C. §107 (2000).
27.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 374-75.
28.
Id. at 389. While Benkler's discussion centers more on "peer production of
29.
information" and "cultural productions," he claims to include within its scope
"entertainment" goods. Id. at 382-83.
DAN TAPsco'r & ANTHONY D. WILLIAMS, WIKINOMICS: How MASS
30.
COLLABORATION CHANGES EVERYTHING ix (Expanded ed., Penguin Group 2008) (2006)

("With the costs of collaboration falling precipitously, companies can increasingly source
ideas, innovations, and uniquely qualified minds from a vast global pool of talent.").
Benkler, supra note 2, at 379 n.18. See also id. ('Most collaborative fiction sites,
31.
however, suffer from the fact that modularity and granularity lead to disjunction relative
to our expectations of novels.").
32.
Goldman, supra note 18. Goldman predicts that problems with spamming and
squabbles over content edits and vandalism will bring the site down. Id.
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viability of open-source software.33 In the following discussion, I will
explore a different issue that may arise for Benkler's model-one
having to do with his account of contributor motivation and, more
generally, the strategic structure of the sorts of activities he intends to
model. If Benkler is wrong in his account of the human motivations
that maintain peer production, perhaps the correct model will lead to
a more pessimistic prediction regarding the sustainability of these
important contributions to social welfare. The opposite may be true as
well, however; perhaps the better account is one that is optimistic
about the potential for peer production.
B. ContributorMotivations
Benkler contends that problems in providing peer production
have the strategic structure of a "tragedy of the commons." Benkler
notes, "These generally would fall under the 'tragedy of the commons'
critique, which I purposefully invoke by calling the phenomenon
'commons-based' peer production." 34 Benkler fairly states that "[t]he
traditional objections to the commons are primarily twofold. First, no
one will invest in a project if they cannot appropriate its benefits.
That is, motivation will lack. Second, no one has the power to
organize collaboration in the use of the resource." 35 Of these two
concerns, Benkler's focus is on the motivation question, as this is what
36
has historically been seen as the most serious obstacle to overcome.
If Benkler is correct in this characterization, there is reason for
concern, as solutions to the tragedy of the commons are widely
considered to be fragile.37 Given Benkler's modeling of the problem, a
33.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 423 n.93.
This skepticism is more often encountered in questions in conferences and
presentations than in formal papers. A well-articulated written example of a
skeptic's view, however, is Glass, comparing recruiting operating system
developers to Tom Sawyer's whitewashing the fence trick and arguing that
eventually operating system efforts will die because too many important
programming tasks are not fun/sexy enough.
Id.
34.
Id. at 378.
35.
Id.
36.
Id. at 378.
37.
RUSSELL HARDIN, COLLECTIVE ACTION 8 & 9 (Johns Hopkins University Press,
1982). Hardin argues that if collective-action problems are solved due to a bout of otherregarding behavior, they will tend to unravel over time due to the collective-action problem.
Cass Sunstein, Human Behavior and the Law of Work, 87 VA. L. REV. 205, 251 (2001) ("It is
possible that workers will relinquish these rights too cheaply or that collective action
problems will induce workers to act against their best interests . . . . [T]his argument
cannot be said to be wrong, but it rests on fragile grounds."); see also generally STEVEN
HETCHER, NORMS IN A WIRED WORLD (Cambridge University Press, 2004) [hereinafter
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full appreciation of the issues on the table in this Article requires
some background discussion of the rational actor or economic
approach to collective-action problems such as the tragedy of the
38
commons.
As the epigram to this Article indicates, Beth Novack has
rightly noted that there currently exists no theory of collective action
in a networked digital context. 39 Benkler's article is a seminal
contribution toward the sort of theory Novack calls for. Of particular
importance, it challenges the iconic model of production outlined by
Ronald Coase in his seminal work on the theory of the firm. 40 Benkler
analyzes peer production as an alternative, or compliment, to
production by a traditional firm. Peer production emerges, as firms do
in Coase's analysis, 41 because it can have lower information
opportunity costs under certain technological and economic conditions.
There is an alternative theoretical framework-rational-choice
theory-that may also be brought to bear on the topic. One of the
patron saints of this literature, Thomas Schelling, relies on his
background as an economist, but much of the work most relevant to
rational-choice theory has come from political theorists and
philosophers. 42 Their focus is not on the firm, but on patterns of social
behavior. One might argue that the rational-choice approach is more
HETCHER, NORMS]; Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243

(1968), available at http://www.physics.ohio-state.edu/-wilkins/sciandsoc/tragedy.pdf.
38.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 379. Benkler notes, "As for a project's mechanisms for
defending itself from incompetent or malicious contributions, one sees peer production
enterprises using a variety of approaches toward solving collective action problems that are
relatively familiar from the commons literature offline." Id.
39.
See also NOVECK, supra note 1, at 266 ("[11f we want to engage in participatory
groups, which depend upon the sharing of responsibility and power, the nature of
cyberspace itself thwarts the coordination of such forms of collective action ....

[Wle, thus

far, have had limited experience creating structured environments for group life.").
40.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 374.
In this Article, I approach this puzzle by departing from free software. Rather
than trying to explain what is special about software or hackers, I generalize
from the phenomenon of free software to suggest characteristics that make largescale collaborations in many information production fields sustainable and
productive in the digitally networked environment without reliance either on
markets or managerial hierarchy. Hence the title of this Article-to invoke the
challenge that the paunchy penguin mascot of the Linux kernel development
community poses for the view of organization rooted in Coase's work.
Id.
41.
See generally R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937).
42.

THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 300 (Harvard University

Press, 1981). See Benkler, supra note 2. Benkler does not tie his discussion into the
rational choice literature in a systematic way. For instance, he does not cite to any of the
canon of contributors, such as Schelling, Olson, Axelrod, Hardin, Elster, or Barry. This is
not a criticism, as the article accomplishes a great deal. But it does suggest an avenue of
cognate research of a sort initiated in the present Article. Id.

2009]

BENKLER & THE NATURE OFPEER PRODUCTION

applicable, given that as Benkler defines peer productions, they do not
essentially depend on any elements of a firm. The better thought,
however, is that each perspective has its function, as some of the most
compelling examples of peer production seem to be hybrids of firms
and informal patterns of coordinated behavior. 4 3 Thus, part of
developing a broader theory of collective action in a digital
environment is to situate peer productions more firmly within the
rational choice literature than Benkler does. Benkler does this to
some extent, of course, as he models peer production after the tragedy
of the commons, and refers to non-participation as "defection." 44 But
as will be seen below, the tragedy of the commons is only part of the
story.
1. A Closer Look at the Tragedy of the Commons
The tragedy of the commons, at least in the more capacious use
of the term in which "commons" refers to public goods, is roughly
synonymous with other frequently used terms: the prisoner's dilemma,
the free-rider problem, the public-goods problem, and the collectiveaction problem. 45 The term "commons," in its more literal use, refers
to a resource accessible to all members of a group such as a plot of
land accessible to all members of a community for grazing livestock or
46
a body of water accessible to all for fishing or whaling.
Modern economic theory draws a fundamental distinction
between private goods and public goods. 47 When markets are

43.
While Benkler's focus is on not-for-profits such as Linux and Wikipedia,
Lawrence Lessig, in his recent book, focuses on the potential for for-profit firms to develop
business models built around such hybrids. LESSIG, REMIX, supra note 11, at 178 ("The
Internet is the age of the hybrid . . . If sharing economies promise value, it is the
commercial economy that is tuned to exploit that.").
44.
E.g., Benkler, supra note 2, at 379-80.
45.
While the term "collective-action problem" is often used synonymously with
these other terms, I have argued for a revision in usage based on the fact that important
solutions to collective-action problems, such as forming coordination norms or epistemic
norms, do not have the strategic structure of the classic public-goods/prisoner's
dilemma/tragedy of the commons/free-rider problem. HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 37, at
250-51.
46.
For a discussion of livestock grazing in the context of tragedy of the commons,
see Hardin, supra note 37, at 1244.
47.
Niva Elkin-Koren & Eli M. Salzberger, Law and Economics in Cyberspace, 19
INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 553, 559 (2000), available at http://www.sciencedirect.com
/science/article/B6V7M-3YJYR6T-9/2/13flebae 18465007b77f3 lccbd9a367c.
A public good is a commodity with two distinctive but related characteristics:
nonexcludability and nonrivalry ....Public goods are not likely to be produced
and supplied by the market, and if they are privately provided, they are likely to
be undersupplied. Thus, government intervention is necessary to guarantee the
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functioning properly, private goods will be provided and consumed at
an efficient level. 48 By contrast, public goods present a problem for
markets. Public goods have two features that create the problemjointness of supply and impossibility of exclusion. 49 Rational actors
will naturally seek to free ride on the provision of goods provided by
others, because if the good is supplied and other steps are not taken,
exclusion from consumption will be impossible; moreover, since the
good will be in joint supply, the fact that the person did not take part
in providing the good will not deter her from taking part in its
consumption. 50 The problem is that every other rational actor is in the
same position; each will do best if she is able to free ride on the
provision of the public good by others. Thus, even though the good
would be beneficial to the public in the sense that all would benefit
from its provision, if each had to contribute to that provision, the good
would not be provided.
The peer productions that Benkler cites are not commons in
the literal sense, but rather are public goods in that if they are
provided for one, they are provided for all, and consumption by one
does not lessen the amount available to others. Thus when Benkler
refers to a commons, he is using the term in the increasingly common
metaphorical sense in which it is applicable to any good (or service)
satisfying the conditions for a public good-jointness of supply and
impossibility of exclusion. The reference to tragedy is apt, as any
rational actor will ask herself why she should spend the time
contributing to Wikipedia or Linux when she can alternatively engage
in some unrelated activity yet still be able to use Wikipedia or Linux
when it suits her. The problem is that if other potential contributors
to Linux and Wikipedia reason in the same manner (which, under the
assumptions of rational actor theory, they will), all will decide to free
ride. But if everyone reasons in this manner, these revolutionary
optimal supply of public goods, either by subsidizing the private provision of the
good or by producing it itself.

Id.
48.
49.

Id.

Id. Benkler holds that nonexcludibility is less important to his account than is
nonrivalry. Benkler, supra note 2, at 404 n.74.
50.
Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 47, at 559 ('The marginal costs of
exclusion are often greater than the marginal costs of provision, so it is inefficient to spend
resources to exclude nonpayers. Such free-riding reduces the incentives for investment in
generating new information .... ").With respect to software, some commentators have
discussed Gnutella as an example of free riding. See Eytan Adar & Bernardo A. Huberman,
Free Riding on Gnutella, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 2, 2000, http://firstmonday.org
/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fmlarticleview/792/701; Clay Shirky, In Praise of Free
Loaders, OPENP2P.COM, Dec. 1, 2000, http://www.openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2000/12/01

/shirkyfreeloading.html.
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informational goods will cease to be provided or never be provided in
the first place-a tragedy, to be sure.
It is typical for the economic analysis of intellectual property to
be modeled as a public good due to its intangible nature. 51 Their
intangibility is what allows intellectual-property goods to satisfy the
conditions for a public good. Creative works are non-rival in their
consumption in as much as consumption by one person does not mean
there is any less--of a book, for instance-to be consumed by another
person. Once a book is published, unless copyright steps in to create
artificial barriers (via digital-rights management, for example), there
is nothing but the increasingly small cost of making a copy to stop
those who wish to consume the book for free from doing so, despite
their having played no role in the production of the work. Thus, there
is both impossibility of exclusion and jointness of supply.
The difference between a typical creative work such as a book
and those peer-produced works considered by Benkler, then, is not the
rational structure of the good, since both typical intellectual-property
goods and Benkler's peer productions fit the requirements for a public
good. In a typical example from copyright, discussion focuses on the
"work" of an "author."52 From this standpoint, what is so striking
about the examples of peer production that Benkler discusses is that
the number of producers of the good is not just somewhat larger than
a single author, as is the case with a film involving the creative efforts
of a number of people. With peer production of the sort Benkler has in
mind, the number of producers is huge; as he notes, the contribution
53
can be in the "tens of thousands" or even a "quarter million" people.
The large size of the producing group is something Benkler's
peer productions share with some of the classic examples in rational51.
Elkin-Koren & Salzberger, supra note 47, at 559 ("Information under standard
economic analysis is such a public good .... This is because information has no physical
boundaries, and its duplication and distribution involve relatively low costs.").
52.
See, e.g., Oren Brancha, The Ideology of Authorship Revisited: Authors, Markets,
and Liberal Values in Early American Copyright, 118 YALE L.J. 186, 188 (2008)
("Copyright in the West, we are often told, is deeply entangled with the modern notion of
authorship. Authorship is copyright's ghost in the machine. In American culture, too, the
author-as the heroic creator of original intellectual works and as their rightful ownerlooms large.").
53.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 374.
Tens of thousands of individuals collaborate in five-minute increments to map
Mars's craters, fulfilling tasks that would normally be performed by full-time
Ph.D.s. A quarter of a million people collaborate on creating the most important
news and commentary site currently available on technology issues. Twenty-five
thousand people collaborate to create a peer-reviewed publication of commentary
on technology and culture. Forty thousand people collaborate to create a more
efficient human-edited directory for the Web than Yahoo.

VANDERBILT J. OFENT AND TECH. LAW

[Vol. 11:4:963

choice literature. For example, in his seminal work, Collective Action,
5 4
Russell Hardin provides extended analyses of large-scale groups.
The groups Hardin focuses on do not produce works, creative or
otherwise, but instead take part in political action. Hardin studies the
environmental movement and the woman's movement, each of which
5
involved thousands or even millions of participants in its heyday. 5
This similarity of numerosity alone suggests why Benkler would do
well to pay more attention to the classic rational-choice literature. In
the literature on the collective-action problem, size matters: generally
speaking, the larger the group involved, the greater difficulty the
group will encounter in solving its collective-action problems. 56 Thus,
on the one hand, Benkler might well mention that in light of the
public-goods problem as generally understood, the sorts of examples
he is interested in promise to be especially difficult to solve. On the
other hand, to the extent that his proposed solution is credible, it is all
the more impressive given the large sizes of the groups he studies.
Indeed, Benkler's explanation as to how the tragedy of the
commons is solved with regard to peer production is all the more
interesting in that he provides reason to think that, at least with
respect to the examples he develops, larger size may actually be a
positive factor. For example, with the continuing development of
Linux, the more eyes that are looking at some software bug, the more
likely it is to be solved; in the case of Wikipedia, the more people
involved in contributing, the more likely it may be that someone with
greater knowledge of a particular subject will provide a contribution in
the area of her expertise.5 7 In other words, larger size can actually be
54.
HARDIN, supra note 37.
55.
Id. at 15, 32 (noting the involvement of the environmentalists and the women's
movement, respectively).
Id. at 20-22 (describing Mancur Olson's famous hypothesis that larger groups
56.
are more likely to fail than smaller ones). In the legal literature, Robert Ellickson provides
the seminal theory as to solving iterated collective action problems. ROBERT ELLICKSON,
ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES (1991). In his account, size
matters as well-his account relies on close-knit communities-and, other things equal, the
larger a group, the more difficulty it will have being close-knit. Id. at 182 ("Smallness is
therefore indeed highly correlated with close-knittedness.").
57.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 414.
The widely distributed model of information production will better identify who
is the best person to produce a specific component of a project, all abilities and
availability to work on the specific component of a project, all abilities and
availability to work on the specific module within a specific time frame
considered.
Id. If this is true, it is an important reply to the sort of argument made by Andrew Keen,
who argues that amateur production will lead to a lowering of quality. See generally
ANDREW KEEN, THE CULT OF THE AMATEUR: How TODAY'S INTERNET IS KILLING OUR
CULTURE (2007). Keen focuses on the sorts of examples in which it is more plausible to
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a positive factor in providing peer-produced content. To the extent
that Benkler can establish this claim, it is highly significant,
particularly in comparison to the orthodox solution to the free-rider
problem on which ease of solution is inversely correlated with the size
of the group. 58 Indeed, the question is begged as to how the sorts of
informational and cultural goods that Benkler studies are different
from those studied by classic collective-action theory, such that this
important difference emerges. As I discuss below, other important
differences emerge as well, such as that sanctions and iterated play
have almost no role in Benkler's account, while they are crucial to the
classic accounts that purport to solve the collective-action problem.
2. Peer Production as a Potential Solution to the
Tragedy of the Commons
In light of the above remarks, the fundamental question is
whether Benkler is right in his characterization of peer production as
a solution to the tragedy of the commons. 59 If the answer is yes, then
the next important inquiries include how widespread the phenomenon
he describes is, and what potential there is for significant new peer
production. Given the great social utility of the examples he develops,
there would, other things equal, be a great social interest in new types
of peer production, and perhaps in altering some details of copyright
law so as to facilitate this goal. Considering the explosive growth of
multiplayer video games, the model may be very generalizable indeed
if Benkler is correct that these games are properly viewed as peer

suppose that an army of amateurs will not be in a position to provide the same quality of
contributions. He provides the example of journalists who have spent years gaining
expertise and compares these to amateur bloggers. Id. at 46-56. He draws the conclusion
that bloggers spouting their opinions are in no position to be able to offer news or analysis
with a comparable level of quality because they do not have a comparable level of expertise.
Id. With the sorts of peer productions Benkler examines, however, it is plausible that
individual amateurs may indeed possess specialized knowledge or skills that can lead to
uniquely valuable contributions. See id.
58.
See infra text accompanying note 76.
59.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 379 (acknowledging that free software may be an
exception, commenting that, "It certainly should not be that these volunteers will beat the
largest and best-financed business enterprises in the world at their own game. And yet,
this is precisely what is happening in the software industry"). There have been writings
that focus on the special characteristics of software as peer production. E.g., James Bessen,
Open Source Software: Free Provision of Complex Public Goods (July 2005), available at
http://www.researchoninnovation.org/opensrc.pdf (explaining how open-source software
contradicts the traditional idea that public goods will not be efficiently provided without
ownership rights or government intervention).
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production. 60 Whereas he does include games in passing as within the
ambit of peer production, Benkler says very little about this
subcategory. 6 1 One cannot help but wonder if this is because game
playing is not so obviously a net provider of substantial social welfare
in the manner of free software and Wikipedia. 62 To the extent that
video games are accurately viewed as peer productions, and videogame playing has questionable social value, the implication arises
that peer productions are not per se socially valuable; there are
valuable ones-Benkler's exemplars, for instance-but there are
deleterious ones as well. Peer-produced pornography may be an
63
example.
In the following discussion, I will argue that while Benkler's
account is important and original, it suffers from a conflation of
collective-action models. In particular, in light of his own analysis, his
modeling of peer production as a tragedy of the commons is flawed.
Under the motivational assumptions that Benkler defends, peer
production is properly modeled as involving coordination norms or
conventions. 64 This distinction may have important consequences, for,
as Benkler notes, the "descriptive" thesis he propounds may have
60.

Scott Duke Harris, Gazillion Debuts with Marvel, Lego Online Game Deals, SAN

JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Mar. 16,2009, http://www.mercurynews.com/business

/ci_11928516?nclickcheck=l (noting that, despite the recession, the online-game industry
has recorded double-digit growth).
61.
See Benkler, supra note 2, at 389.
62.
Giles Whittell, Video Games: I'll Never Buy One, THE TIMES (London), Apr. 2,
2008, available at http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/comment/columnists/guest
_contributors/article3663097.ece ("[C]ompared with everything else on offer in a kid's life,
video games and heroin and teenage pregnancy are a colossal waste of time."). Benkler
compares socially valuable peer production with so-called "purely nonproductive
consumption." Benkler, supra note 2, at 371. He writes, "[P]eer production draws effort
that in many cases would otherwise have been directed toward purely nonproductive
consumption-say, watching television instead of marking craters on Mars, ranking
websites for the Open Directory Project, or authoring entries for Wikipedia." This
argument is specious, however, given that he counts gaming as relevant peer-productive
activity. Id.
63.
Ann Bartow, Pornography, Coercion, and Copyright Law 2.0, 10 VAND. J. ENT.
& TECH. L. 799, 838-39 (2008).
Copyright law could be reconfigured to alter incentives related to current
pornography creation and distribution patterns. The ability to register and
enforce copyrights on pornographic works could be linked to compliance with a
regulatory scheme intended to promote the safety and well-being of everyone
connected with the works' production and commercial exploitation.
Id.
64.
The locus classicus on conventions is DAVID HUME, A TREATISE OF HUMAN
NATURE (Project Gutenberg 2003) (1739), available at http://www.gutenberg.org/etext
/4705. For discussion on the distinction between conventions and coordination norms, see
HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 37. See also Gerald J. Postema, Coordination and
Convention at the Foundationsof Law, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1982).
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significant normative implications, 65 and these implications, he
speculates, may stretch to core issues in copyright law and beyond
that to political morality. 66 Particularly interesting in this respect is
Benkler's suggestion that ownership itself may actually introduce
transaction costs that impede peer production. 67 Benkler's account
thus serves to provide novel support that might help to revive the
68
dotCommunist manifesto of Web 1.0 lore.
C. Alternative Perspectives
There are two key analytic moves in Benkler's account. His
first is to argue that contributors to peer production, under the right
conditions, may receive "social-psychological rewards" that serve to
motivate the creators despite a lack of, or indeed an inverse relation
to, monetary rewards. 69 The second analytic move focuses on the size
of the contribution that must be made, the basic intuition being that
the smaller the contribution, the less sacrifice required and thus the
more inclined people will be to make such contributions. 70
Benkler contends that agents have preferences for rewards of
three types.

65.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 379 n. 18. Elsewhere, Benkler does draw out
normative implications from the general sort of framework developed in this article. See
Yochai Benkler, There is No Spoon, in THE STATE OF PLAY 183-84 (Jack M. Balkin & Beth
Simone Novack, eds., 2006) [hereinafter Benkler, Spoon]. Benkler suggests that there may
be substantial costs to introducing property rights into an enterprise such as Second Life,
such that it may be normatively preferable to have the game gods keep control of the
property. This is a potentially important implication, as it flies in the face of much
contemporary commentary on the desirability of property rights in UGC by the
participants in virtual worlds. Id. See, e.g., Cory Ondrejka, Escaping the Gilded Cage: User
Generated Content and Building the Metaverse, in THE STATE OF PLAY, supra, at 158-76
(Jack M. Balkin & Beth Simone Noveck eds., 2006).
66.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 380.
67.
Id. at 407 (holding out the prospect of "allocation efficiencies gained from the
absence of property").
68.
Dot-communism is roughly the view that content on the Internet should be
subject to less or no copyright protection. See, e.g. Eben Moglen, Lecture at the University
of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, The dotCommunist Manifesto: How Culture Became
Property and What We're Going To Do About It (Nov. 8, 2001), available at
http://www.ibiblio.org/speakers/index.cgi/2001/11/1 (video stream).
69.
Id. at 378.
70.
Id. Benkler sets out conditions for producing commons-based peer productions
on the second model. First, peer productions must be modular. Id. at 378. Second, the
"modules" that are contributed "should be predominantly fine-grained, or small in size." Id.
at 379. The reason for this condition is that this will allow for the maintenance of peer
productions that require "contributions from larger numbers of contributors whose
motivation levels will not sustain anything more than small efforts toward the project." Id.
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Monetary rewards, which decrease in value because of the
decreasing marginal utility of money. Call the rate at
which M decreases s (satiation).
H
Intrinsic hedonic rewards experiences from taking
actions.
SP --+Social-psychologicalrewards, which are a function of the
cultural meaning associated with the act and may take
the form of actual effect on social associations and status
perception by others or on internal satisfaction from one's
social relationships or the culturally determined meaning
71
of one's action.
--

Benkler refers to "mechanisms for indirect appropriation of the
benefits of participation" in order to indicate all three of the above
preferences. 72 The first of these corresponds to economic benefit-he
considers the sorts of factors that others have pointed to, such as
reputation benefits, or other indirect economic benefits, such as
enhanced job prospects. 73 He also includes what he refers to as "more
mundane benefits, such as consulting contracts, customization
services, and increases in human capital that are paid for by
employers who can use the skills gained from participation in free
software development in proprietary projects." 74 Benkler is willing to
acknowledge that these economic factors may all play some roleeither within one person or across persons-in the panoply of
75
preferences that sustain peer production.
To the extent that Benkler's model relies on indirect economic
benefits such as reputation enhancement, it falls within a venerable
solution to the tragedy of the commons that has been developed
elsewhere. The best-known example in the legal literature comes from
Robert Ellickson, the seminal figure in the law and norms movement,
who argues that rational actors in close-knit groups may cooperate in
situations with the strategic structure of a prisoner's dilemma when
that close-knitedness allows both for "iterated" play-that is, a
repetition of the situations at issue-and for the formation of
reputations. 76 By contrast, iterated play and reputation formation,
71.
Id. at 426.
72.
Id. at 424.
73.
Id. at 425.
74.
Id.
75.
Id. at 378.
76.
ELLICKSON, supra note 56, at 177-81; see also Benkler, supra note 2, at 438.
Benkler notes in passing that tight-knit relationships may be a factor in the explanation of
a particular example. "[The likelihood of free-riding generally increases as the size of the
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per se, play no essential role in Benkler's account of rational
conformity. His peer-production participants would presumably be
motivated to conform even in a single-shot game, 77 because due to the
"indirect appropriation" Benkler describes, it is in their interest to do
so. 78
Thus, while Ellickson and Benkler both accord a role to
reputation, their accounts are significantly different. For Ellickson,
reputation as a cooperator is essential. For Benkler, the pursuit of a
good reputation may be one of the operative motives of a peerproduction participant, depending on the person and the type of peer
79
production at issue, but it is not essential to his model.
Indeed, Benkler does not rely on the sort of economic model
championed by Ellickson in the legal literature. This fact is evident
when Benkler writes, "A new model of production has taken root, one
that should not be there, at least according to our most widely held
beliefs about economic behavior."8 0 According to the widely held
beliefs that Benkler is referring to, namely those that together make
up the traditional rational-choice model, free riders should doom the
putative peer production to failure. He even goes further, explicitly
pool increases and the probability of social-norms-based prevention of free-riding
declines."). One example that Benkler gives of a close-knit community is that of Distributed
Proofreaders, a group of volunteers who proofread Project Gutenberg texts.

Distributed Proofreaders, a site unaffiliated with Project Gutenberg, is devoted
to proofing Project Gutenberg e-texts more efficiently by distributing the
volunteer proofreading function in smaller and more information-rich modules.
In the Distributed Proofreaders process, scanned pages are stored on the site and
volunteers are shown a scanned page and a page of the e-text simultaneously so
that the volunteer can compare the e-text to the original page. Because of the
fine-grained modularity, proofreaders can proof one or a few pages and submit
them. By contrast, the entire book is typically exchanged on the Project
Gutenberg site, or at minimum a chapter. In this fashion, Distributed
Proofreaders clears the proofing of thousands of pages every month.
Interestingly, these sites show that even the most painstaking, some might say
mundane, jobs can be produced on a distributed model. Here the motivation
problem may be particularly salient, but it appears that a combination of
bibliophilia and community ties suffices (both sites are much smaller and more
tightly knit than, for example, the Linux kernel development community.
Id. at 399.
77.
A single-shot game is one in which the players interact in a strategic situation
only once. For a discussion of the single-shot game, see Steven Hetcher, Changing the
Social Meaning of Privacy in Cyberspace, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 149, 199-203 (2001).
78.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 425 ("Given that two-thirds of the revenues of the
software industry are service-based and that the total revenues of the software industry
are three times the size of the movie, video, and sound-recording industries combined,
indirect appropriation offers a rich field of enterprise for participants in free-software
development.").
79.
Id. at 396 ("[T]he system also allows users to build reputation over time and to
gain greater control over the accreditationof their own work relative to the power of the
critics." (emphasis added)). But he also considers peer productions in which reputation
plays no role. Id. at 424-25.
80.
Id. at 371.
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characterizing his model as an affront to hegemonic motivational
assumptions that he sees as characterizing the American psyche
beyond the confines of academic discourse. He writes, "The intuitions
of the late twentieth-century American resist the idea that thousands
8
of volunteers could collaborate on a complex economic project." '
Benkler begs to differ.
With regard to the second type of preference for reward,
Benkler notes, "At the broadest level, there is the pleasure of creation.
Whether you refer to this pleasure dispassionately as 'hedonic gain' or
romantically as 'an urge to create,' the mechanism is simple. People
are creative beings. They will play at creation if given an opportunity,
and the network and free access to information resources provide this
opportunity."8 2 He claims that in some circumstances participation is
"fun,"8 3 and that these considerations mean that, in the end, the
84
participant benefits from "indirect appropriation."
Of these three types of preferences for rewards, the last is the
most difficult to understand. He characterizes social-psychological
rewards as "a function of the cultural meaning associated with the act
[that] may take the form of actual effect on social associations and
status perception by others or on internal satisfaction from one's social
relations or the culturally determined meaning of one's action."8' 5
As will be seen in the next Part, there is deep disagreement
regarding the existence of these social-psychological rewards.
Returning for a moment to the mention of Ellickson above, one might
suppose that Benkler does not discuss venerable rational-choice
accounts with respect to the tragedy of the commons because he may
see himself as setting out a competing theory. It is not clear that he
sees himself as doing so, however, as Benkler does not make this
claim. Thus, even if Benkler is correct regarding peer production, he

81.
Id.
82.
Id.
83.
Id. at 390.
84.
Id. at 405 n.76; Benkler characterizes indirect appropriation as follows:
"Indirect appropriation" is appropriation of the value of one's effort by means
other than reliance on the excludability of the product of the effort. For example,
someone who is paid as a teacher but gets the position in reliance on his
scholarship is indirectly appropriating the benefit of his scholarship. An IBM
engineer who gains human capital by working on GNUJLinux from home in the
evening is indirectly appropriating the benefits of her efforts in participating in
the production of GNU/Linux. The term is intended to separate out appropriation
that is sensitive to excludability of information-direct appropriation through
intellectual property-and appropriation that is independent of exclusion from
the information-indirect appropriation without intellectual property.
Id.
85.

Id. at 426-27.
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has made no claim that all tragedies of the commons are currently
being, or should be, solved in this manner. Perhaps the methods
explored by Ellickson and Hardin, among others, are more appropriate
to some types of peer production, and Benkler's to others. Or perhaps
the best approach will combine the classic approaches of Hardin and
Ellickson with that of Benkler. Given the social value of peerproduced content such as open-source software and Wikipedia, surely
it is worth exploring whether hybrid regulatory solutions may be most
effective in certain circumstances. Thus, the following discussion will
critique Benkler's account not just for critique's sake, but also in order
to better understand whether the solution he proffers might possibly
dovetail with the classic solutions to form a hybrid solution that is
more potent than either alone.
II. THE CRITIQUE OF BENKLER'S ACCOUNT

The question of whether Benkler has solved the tragedy of the
commons is actually two questions: first, does Benkler's solution work
in the context of peer production, and second, does it work more
generally? I argue that it does neither, and the reason is simple. To
the extent that cooperation is primarily explained by characterizing
participation as (1) fun, (2) providing a social-psychological benefit, or
(3) in some other way in the direct economic interest of the
participants,8 6 there is no longer a tragedy of the commons. Here it is
important to distinguish between solving the tragedy of the commons
or free-rider problem, on the one hand, and in essence changing the
structure of the game to avoid the problem, on the other. In sum, my
claim is that Benkler does the latter.
As already noted, the defining feature of a tragedy of the
commons or free-rider problem is that a rational actor will prefer not
to contribute or continue contributing toward the production of the
public good, but instead to free ride on the contributions of others.8 7
Actors cooperate only if this preference for defection in the single-shot
game is outweighed by some stronger consideration. For example,
according to Ellickson, under suitable conditions of close-knitedness
and iterated interactions, the prospective benefits of cooperation over
the course of repeated interactions will outweigh those benefits to be
gained by defection from cooperative behavior, due to the cost of being

86.
Id. at 384-85. Benkler uses the example of the NASA Clickworkers project as
something done for "fun." Benkler, note 2, at 384 n.29.
87.
See supra text accompanying notes 45-51.
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sanctioned for one's defection.88 The key is that this initial preference
to defect remains, such that if the countervailing consideration of the
benefits to be gained through cooperative iterative behavior disappear,
the rational actor will prefer to defect from cooperation.
By contrast, the core features of a free-rider problem do not
exist in the solution Benkler sets out. This requires some explanation,
however, as Benkler unhelpfully refers to all three types of
motivations that drive participation as "indirect."8 9 To paraphrase
Abraham Lincoln, to call a tail a leg does not change the fact that a
dog has four legs. 90 Similarly, to label what are most meaningfully
seen to be direct preferences as indirect preferences does not make
them indirect preferences. One cannot change the actual nature of the
preferences that drive people to cooperate in real-world situations by a
simple act of labeling. The question, then, is which label is more
meaningful or conceptually accurate as a characterization of the
framework Benkler prefers. I would contend that either one or two of
Benkler's three types of preferences for rewards are best characterized
as direct, depending on whether one is an adherent to a Hobbesian or
a Humean approach to rational actor theory. 91 What matters is
whether, for any given participant, it is the direct or indirect
88.
The main form of sanction is that others will refuse to enter into future
cooperative relationships. ELLICKSON, supra note 56, at 179-80.
89.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 424 ("[Tlhe incentive problem as an objection to the
general sustainability of peer production is in large part resolved by the existence of a
series of mechanisms for indirect appropriation of the benefits of participation ...").
Quotes,
DogQuotations.com,
Dog
Abraham
Lincoln
90.
(last visited Mar. 17,
http://www.dogquotations.com/abraham-lincoln-dog-quotes.html
2009) ("How many legs does a dog have if you call the tail a leg? Four. Calling a tail a leg
doesn't make it a leg.").
HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 37, at 100. The most extreme rationalist position
91.
holds that all behavior is narrowly rational. Because this is sometimes thought to have
been Hobbes's position, I will refer to holders of this view as Hobbesians. These theorists
characteristically offer accounts of how patterns of behavior that seem to be moral on their
face really result from the subtle machinations of enlightened self-interest. Impressionistic
evidence strongly suggests, however, that few rational-choice theorists who explicitly
discuss the matter defend this extreme position. Another group of rational theorists, while
also delighting in debunking conventional understandings of many practices, nevertheless
are willing to grant the real though limited existence of genuinely moral motivation.
Typically, these theorists appear to think that although morality cannot be entirely
forgotten, it is nevertheless marginal so that, for most purposes, straightforward rationalchoice analysis is still the best approach. See HETCHER, supra note 37, at 100.
("[C]onventions may be a species of norms: regularities to which we believe one ought to
conform. I shall argue that they are. There are certain probable consequences implied by
the fact that an action would conform to a convention (whatever the action and whatever
the convention) which are presumptive reasons, according to our common opinions, why
that action ought to be done. This position is historically most associated with Hume, who
took a view of the world that natural human sympathy could be a source of genuinely
other-regarding behavior.")
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preferences that drive participation. Either way, however, Benkler's
account is incorrect.
If direct preferences alone are enough to
motivate individual participation, then the situation for this
participant no longer presents a tragedy of the commons or free-rider
problem and there is no need to bring the indirect preferences into the
explanation.
People are not participating against their direct
preferences in a single-shot game in order to garner the long-term
benefits of iterated, cooperative play, but instead are cooperating
because of direct preferences to do so.
On the other hand, if it takes the addition of indirect
preferences to shift the rational choice from defection to conformity,
then it is these indirect preferences that tip the balance. The actor
indeed faces a situation with the structure of a free-rider problem as
the direct motivation in the single-shot game is to defect from
cooperation. It is only the prospect of indirect benefits that makes
participation the maximizing choice on balance. If Benkler's account
is to rely on indirect benefits outbalancing direct benefits, however, he
owes us a more detailed explanation as to why indirect trumps direct.
Benkler's comments with regard about indirect benefits do not provide
sufficient detail to provide a plausible explanation as to how the
indirect benefits could function in the absence of sanctions or iterated
play to turn erstwhile defectors into cooperators. The reason for
Benkler's failure to even attempt to provide such an account should be
obvious; he does not think it is incumbent upon him to do so, given his
(mistaken, I argue) belief that it is sufficient that all three types of
motivation in aggregate are enough to motivate participation.
Note, however, that in his remarks on economic motivations,
Benkler does implicitly appeal to what are in effect considerations of
iterated play-for example, in his comments on the manner in which
the desire to be awarded contracts, better jobs, tenure, et cetera, may
motivate cooperation. 92 Note that while Benkler does not speak of it
as such, this is in effect an iterated-play argument in that one may
plausibly think that contributing toward Linux, for example, could
enhance one's potential to be awarded contracts or to receive other
benefits. Benkler's argument, in effect, depends on a cooperator's
ability to develop a good reputation, and this supposes some sort of
iterated-play account. If one is always in one-shot interactions with
others, one will not be able to develop a reputation as a good software
writer, since reputation depends on others' knowledge of one's
previous software writing actions-in particular, knowledge that one's
previous actions somehow speak well enough that one is deemed more
92.

Supra text accompanying notes 70-75.
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worthy of contracts, promotions, et cetera, than one would otherwise
be. 93 There can be knowledge of one's previous software writing
accomplishments, however, without iterated play of some sort. The
iterated play need not be with the same person. In a close-knit
community, reputation is also spread by word of mouth, such that the
iteration of behavior that is evaluated for reputational purposes may
develop across a series of dyadic relationships, as long as there is a
sufficient amount of overlap between dyads so that there is enough
94
flow of information to allow reputations to form.
The Hobbesian and Humean accounts will differ in their
treatment of Benkler's "social-psychological benefits." Are these direct
benefits pursued for their own sake or done in the pursuit of
In the classic examples of the tragedy of the
something else?
commons, no social-psychological benefit accrues from participation.
In other classic commons problems, participation means refraining
from, for example, overgrazing one's livestock on the commons, or
refraining from whaling, despite the fact that one's livelihood depends
on these activities. A typical husbandman or fisherman could not be
expected to garner intrinsic satisfaction from foregoing the benefits to
be had for himself and his family due to better fed livestock or bigger
catches. Under the assumption of Hobbesian rational-actor theory,
there are no social-psychological benefits apart from those garnered
from taking part in activities that promote one's narrow self-interest,
and the above activities clearly would not do so. Quite the oppositeothers benefit at the expense of oneself and one's family.
Humean theorists might, however, contend that a rational
actor does receive social-psychological benefits from refraining from
over-grazing or over-whaling. Even here, though, it may depend on
whether or not others in the community are likewise refraining. If
they are, then the Humean rational actor would be motivated by a
sense of fairness or reciprocity or altruism to do so as well. 95 If others

93.
94.

ELLICKSON, supra note 56, at 57-58.
HARDIN, supra note 37, at 185-87.

95.
Some commentators have sought to explore the emergence of informational
public goods such as free software by postulating a "gift economy" or "sharing" economy.
See, e.g., Rishab Aiyer Ghosh, Cooking Pot Markets: An Economic Model for the Trade in
Free Goods and Services on the Internet, FIRST MONDAY, Mar. 2, 1998,
http://firstmonday.orghtbincgiwrapfbin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/580/501 (noting that
the motivation for production on the Internet is not necessarily money or altruism, but
rather intangibles that represent a "very tangible market dynamic"). While he cites some of
this work in passing, Benkler's model does not rely on it. Peer participants are not
characterized as sharers or gift givers. Benkler, supra note 2, at 373. Some theorists in the
context of UGC and Web 2.0 economy implicitly acknowledge the problem as well when
they postulate notions such as the "reputation economy" or the "attribution economy." E.g.,
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are not refraining, however, the altruist might nevertheless refrain
while those motivated by fairness or reciprocity might not. Empirical
research has grounded the move away from the Hobbesian account in
favor of the Humean account, and arguably this research is more
robust with regard to fairness and reciprocity than with regard to
96
altruism.
One facile "solution" to the free-rider problem sometimes given
in traditional economic literature is to postulate preferences for
activities such as voting, giving to charity, or the pursuit of esteem. 97
Thus, one is not acting against one's self-interest in giving to charity,
but rather has a "preference" or "taste" for this activity. The problem
with such explanations, however, is that they are circular. Rationalchoice theory is correct by definition if any behavior can be
characterized as rational, simply by postulating a preference for the
behavior, despite the fact that the preference works in opposition to an
intuitively plausible conception of narrow self-interest. Thus, it might
not be overly glib to contend that there are two versions of rationalactor accounts-circular and non-circular ones. 98
Humean theorists are disposed to see other-regarding
preferences as being as fully capable of directly motivating certain
people, as do preferences for narrowly self-interested outcomes. 99 It
appears clear that Benkler would consider himself to be a Humean
Rebecca Tushnet, Payment in Credit: Copyright Law and Subcultural Creativity, 70 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 153 (2007).

Blogs reflect a pervasive sense among different types of creators that credit can
substitute for other indicia of authorship such as payment or control. To take a
highly salient example, legal scholars, like other academics, are often far more
concerned with credit than payment. Discussions with artists and nonlegal
scholars about their perceptions of copyright law and fair use also revealed that
many think of attribution as a legitimate substitute for payment in cases of
nonprofit use.
Id.
96.

See, e.g., Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, The Nature of Human Altruism,

NATURE., Oct. 23, 2003, at 425, 785-791; see generally, articles collected in BEHAVIORAL
ECONOMICS (Cass R. Sunstein ed., 2000).

97.
Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development and Regulation of Norms, 96
MICH. L. REV. 338, 358 (1997).
98.
Note that the prospect of circular and non-circular accounts is possible on both
Humean and Hobbesian approaches. While Humean theorists have a broader conception of
the range of motivations that cause behavior, nevertheless, not anything goes. HETCHER,
supra note 37, at 112. For example, one might be a Humean theorist who acknowledges the
direct motivational force of the desire to behave reciprocally, but rejects the notion that
rational actions are motivated by altruism. I have elsewhere criticized otherwise insightful
accounts such as those of Margolis and Kavka for an undue reliance on altruism, per se, as
opposed to a more nuanced-and more strongly empirically supported-account that looks
to non-altruistic forms of other-regarding motivation. Id.
99.
GREGORY KAVKA, HOBBESIAN MORAL AND POLITICAL THEORY 65 (1986).
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theorist, as he thinks that people sometimes participate contrary to
their self-interests as defined in traditional economic terms. 100 This
would mean that he would see a larger number of motives to
participate in peer production as direct motivations, in the sense that
the actions are pursued for their own sake rather than as an indirect
means serving the narrow self-interest of the cooperators over a series
of iterations.
If these direct motivations do provide sufficient
motivation for some peer production, the practice whereby the content
continues to be produced would have the structure of a convention as
opposed to that of an iterated prisoner's dilemma.101
Benkler's best example for which a direct form of motivation
would be a plausible explanation of participation is that of multiplayer
games such as Ultima Online and EverQuest.10 2 As he notes, such
participation is "fun. 10° 3 Massively multiplayer online role-playing
games are unlike Benkler's examples of peer productions, however.
Benkler refers to the "screenwriter," meaning all the participants in
the game, and speaks of the users as "coauthors" who each make
"individual contributions to the storyline."10 4 The terms in this
description have an odd ring to them. We do not naturally think of
game players as coauthors or the result of their actions as the
production of a storyline; this is supported by the fact that it is highly

100.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 378.
The interaction between money, love, and sex offers an obvious and stark
example, but the tradeoffs that academics face between selling consulting
services, on the one hand, and writing within a research agenda respected by
peers, on the other hand, are also reasonably intuitive. Given these propositions,
it becomes relatively straightforward to see that there will be conditions under
which a project that can organize itself to offer social-psychological rewards
removed from monetary rewards will attract certain people, or at least certain
chunks of people's days, that monetary rewards would not.
Id.
101.

The classic account of convention is DAVID LEWIS, CONVENTION 97 (1969).

RATIONAL MAN AND IRRATIONAL SOCIETY? 21 (Brian Barry and Russell Hardin, eds., 1982)

("Part of the appeal of the assumption of narrow rationality is almost methodological: it is
easy to accommodate in analysis and it is relatively easy to assess in generalizable
behaviors. An additional appeal might be, as is sometimes claimed, that it explains a very
large fraction of behavior in certain realms. One can too easily overrate the size of that
fraction even in the most explicitly economic contexts. But often the assumption of
narrowly rational motivation yields predictions that are the most useful benchmark
against which to assess the extent and the impact of other motivations. Occasionally it
yields predictions that so nearly fit behavior that investigation need to go no further to
satisfy us that we have understood why certain outcomes occur and others do not.")
102.
See Benkler, supra note 2, at 389-90.
103.
Id. at 390; see also text accompanying notes 87-89.
104.
Id.
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doubtful that one could copyright the playing of a game by a large
number of uncoordinated players as a "work" of authorship. 105
Coauthors are presumably synonymous with joint authors. It
is not surprising that, under copyright law, joint authors must each
intend to be a joint author, a condition that is not satisfied in the
gaming context Benkler envisions. 10 6 On Benkler's behalf, however,
one might observe that even if massively multiplayer games are not
stories or works for purposes of copyright, they nevertheless may be
peer production in light of his analysis. After all, his characterization
of peer production does not require copyrightable content. 107 Note,
however, that if peer productions like Linux and Wikipedia are
incorrectly modeled as solutions to tragedies of the commons, it is
especially unintuitive to view multiplayer games in this light: where is
the commons, and who are the free riders? Rather, games are best
viewed as having the structure of a convention-one benefits directly
by participating in games in which others are participating.
Otherwise, why would one do so, given the lack of sanctions for
foregoing such behavior?
If one is inclined toward the Humean account, Benkler's
examples seem like plausible ones. Note how they differ from the
classic examples of tragedies of the commons, where it is implausible
to think that rational actors would have a preference for, for example,
refraining from grazing their cattle, if one's family's livelihood

105.

Midway Manufacturing Co. v. Artic Int'l, Inc., 704 F.2d 1009 (7th Cir. 1983)

(holding that even though the images on the screen were transient, aspects of a video
arcade game are copyrightable by the creator). However, this has become an increasingly
difficult question with increased interactivity in games. Leena M. Sheet & A. Benjamin
Katz, ProtectingRights in Videogames: Next Generation Licensing, 6 VA. SPORTS & ENT.
L.J. 124, 131 (2006).
The Midway court also likened playing a videogame to changing a channel on the
television, rather than the more creative effort required in writing a novel or
painting a picture, and thus, the action on-screen was not a new creation by the
user, and the game was copyrightable. That was twenty-three years ago and,
today, increased interactivity of gaming may deserve another look at the
question of whether what is created on the screen belongs to the player, the
game publisher, or the developer.
Id.
106.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2000) ("A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole."). It is perhaps worth asking whether peer
productions are of significance to copyright even if they are not properly seen as coauthored
works of authorship. For example, perhaps they can colorably be conceptualized as
compilations. This seems problematic as well, however, as the notion of a compilation
implies a compiler. A compilation is copyrightable as a work because the resulting effort
itself displays sufficient creativity to pass the test for copyrightability under Feist. See
Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 361 (1991).
107.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 384-85.
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depends upon it. By contrast, Wikipedia or Linux involve relatively
small per-person costs, and the participants are persons who can
generally afford such other-regarding behavior, particularly in the
small increments in which it is needed for peer production. One does
not need to go far down the road of assuming the existence of moral
motivations (of the sort studied empirically) to see Benkler's examples
as plausible. It is more plausible to suppose that writing a Wikipedia
entry or spotting a software bug is minimally costly, or even fun-at
least for those whose conforming acts constitute the practice. One
08
sacrifices one's time, and time is money, but jobs are lumpy goods.'
Spending a few hours writing a Wikipedia entry or fixing a software
bug does not typically mean working a few less hours. Instead, people
engage in such activity in their free time, so it may be relatively
costless in that the tradeoff is less time for some other form of
recreation.10 9
In a tragedy of the commons, a small number of free ridersperhaps only one-can destroy the value of the commons. Benkler's
peer productions do not have this feature. Instead, a very large
number of non-participants can potentially free ride on the provision
of the good by a relatively small number; Benkler focuses on how large
the numbers of contributors are in absolute terms.11 0 However, these
numbers are small in proportion to the number of people benefitting,
and hence, in a formal sense, free riding. In the case of Wikipedia, for
example, the number of unique visitors to the site is in the millions,
while the number of contributors is in the thousands."' This means
that the number of free riders outnumbers the number of contributors
one-thousand fold. Yet to all appearances there is no sanctioning
behavior on the part of the contributors, suggesting that contributors
are not bothered by the non-contributions of most others, presumably
because they do not perceive the non-conformers as free-riding on
their own conforming actions-actions that they do not view as
onerous but instead prefer to undertake as a direct preference. Thus,
Benkler's social-psychological motivations are thus best interpreted as
See generally Michael Taylor & Hugh Ward, Chickens, Whales, and Other
108.
Lumpy Goods: Alternative Models of Public-Goods Provision, 30 POL. STUD. 350 (1982),
availableat http://www2.warwick.ac.uklfac/soc/economics/ug/modules/2nd/ec228
/details/taylorward.pdf (providing a general background on lumpy goods).
Benkler, supra note 2, at 436-38. Benkler provides other examples and
109.
commentary that go to support the point that participating in peer productions may be less
painful and contrary to natural impulse than conformity to classical free-rider problems
would be. Id.
Supra note 53 and accompanying text.
110.
See Wikipedia Statistics: Contributors, http://stats.wikimedia.org/EN
111.
/TablesWikipediansContributors.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
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implicitly assuming a Humean economic perspective, according to
which people are willing to devote some amount of their efforts to nonself-interested behavior.
For example, it seems quite plausible that people would be
willing to devote some non-self-interested effort out of fairness or
reciprocity for the benefits they receive from the contributions of
others to peer productions such as open-source software. 112 Note that
it is consistent with this account to maintain that most actors are not
motivated in this manner, for as already noted, whereas millions of
people benefit from Linux or Wikipedia, their maintenance requires
only thousands.
In addition to empirical literature supporting a Humean
economic approach, 113 the theoretical literature provides support for
the sort of behavior Benkler hypothesizes. For example, the classic
rational-choice accounts of Gregory Kavka and Howard Margolis take
a basic rational-actor approach, but one that allows for altruistic
motivation at the margin. 11 4 Margolis, for example, provides a
number of conditions under which we may expect altruistic acts, even
by actors with a limited budget for altruism.1 15 This account is similar
to Benkler's in holding that models of social behavior must allow for
the fact that people can only be counted on to make small
contributions of other-regarding behavior (Benkler's modularity
116
requirement).
The question is whether there is any meaningful difference
between Benkler's social-psychological benefits and Margolis or
Kavka's appeal to limited altruism. Benkler's account does not
explain why people have the social-psychological preferences that they
have; for example, why a preference for small contributions over large
contributions? Since it is all indirect appropriation, why are people
not as inclined to receive equally desirable social-psychological
benefits regardless of the size of the contribution? His model offers no
answer. Margolis and Kavka's accounts can provide a more intuitively
plausible answer, which is that people are not completely narrowly
self-interested, but largely so. 11 7 To the extent they do not act in

112.
113.
114.

See Benkler, supra note 2, at 401 n.67.
See supra note 97.
HETCHER, supra note 37, at 101-02.

115.
HOWARD MARGOLIS, SELFISHNESS, ALTRUISM
SOCIAL CHOICE 6 (1982).

& RATIONALITY:

A THEORY OF

116.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 329.
117.
HETCHER, supra note 37, at 101-02. Indeed, Hardin is best read as a Humean
theorist, albeit one who works with first-generation assumptions for the purpose of
methodological rigor. Id.
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narrowly self-interested ways, they will do so sparingly and in a costeffective manner, such that we can predict that people who know
about software will tend to contribute to the free-software movement,
and people who know about odd and sundry topics will contribute to
Wikipedia. Kavka and Margolis's accounts provide more clarity on the
nature of the behavior implicit in a Humean account. The important
feature of other-regarding behavior is that it is not performed because
it provides utility or preference satisfaction to the actor-Benkler's
social-psychological benefits-but rather because it provides utility to
people other than the actor. These are the others who constitute the
other-regardingness of the action.
Benkler provides the following quote from Eben Moglin with
apparent approval: "[I]f you wrap the internet around every person on
the planet, software flows in the network. It's an emergent property of
connected human minds that they create things for one another's
pleasure ..
,118
"..
This statement suggests a dynamic model. A
particular person's preference for participation is affected, or
enhanced, by that person's participation in an information ecosystem
in which others are participating in part for "one another's
pleasure." 1 9 The quote is strongly suggestive of a position in which
someone wants to participate, simplicitor, not because of some
personal social-psychological benefit from doing so. If this is the
model Benkler has in mind, he should clarify this, since the task of
creating and maintaining collective-action solutions of one sort will
typically vary from what is required for maintaining the other sort of
structure. For example, in Moglin's model, individuals will want to
participate simply because they want to please others.' 20 If this is the
model of motivation Benkler wishes to adopt, then he should jettison
the confusing characterizations that such behavior is either "indirect"
or provides a "social-psychological benefit."' 2' Participants pursue the
behavior because of the benefit it provides to others, not to
themselves. This is the nature of other-regarding behavior, and this is
122
how one acts for another's pleasure, to invoke Eben Moglen's words.
I find it plausible that for enough people, contributing to Linux
or Wikipedia could be a cost-justified small altruistic or reciprocal act,
or alternatively, enjoyable behavior on its own terms. My only point is
that this is no longer a tragedy of the commons. As noted, it is only a
118.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 380 n.21 (quoting Eben Moglen, the first to identify
the phenomenon that Benkler calls peer production).
119.
Id.
120.
Id.
121.
Supra notes 69, 89 and accompanying text.
122.
Moglen, supra note 118.
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tragedy of the commons if one assumes rational actors with narrowly
self-interested preferences, but Benkler does not do so. Thus, by the
lights of his own assumptions, his solutions are best modeled as
conventions, not solutions to tragedies of the commons. This means
that in addition to Ronald Coase, Benkler's patron saints are Thomas
Shelling and David Hume, the fathers of the convention, rather than
123
Thomas Hobbes, the father of the free-rider problem.
III. THE BROADER CONCEPTION OF PEER PRODUCTION
Benkler is adamant that his goal in the article is purely
descriptive. He indicates in passing, however, the sort of normative
implication he thinks may follow from his analysis. While these are
not developed in detail, clearly Benkler thinks they are of
fundamental importance. He writes,
The normative implications of recognizing peer production are substantial. At the
level of political morality, the shape of freedom and equality in the emerging socialtechnological condition we associate with the Internet is at stake .... At the level
of institutional design, the emergence of commons-based peer production adds a
new and deep challenge to the prevailing policy of rapid expansion of the scope of
exclusive rights in information and culture that has been the predominant
approach in the past twenty-five years, as James Boyle's work on the second
enclosure movement elegantly elucidates.
Additionally, the dynamic of
decentralized innovation plays a central role in Lawrence Lessig's forceful
argument for embedding the openness of commons in the architecture of the
Internet. In this Article, however, I do not attempt to add to the normative
literature. Instead, the Article is intended as a purely descriptive
account of the
124
scope of the empirical phenomenon and its analytic drivers.

We see here that Benkler thinks that two of the most fundamental
policy issues of the information age may be impacted by the positive
argument he makes-first, the expanding reach of copyright law, and
second, the functional structure of the Internet.
Like Benkler, my discussion has been positive rather than
normative. I also agree with Benkler that the positive analysis
portends significant normative implications. In this final Part, I
contend that the issue of normative implications is more complex and
nuanced than Benkler suggests. The implications he sets out turn to
an important extent on the positive examples he chooses to highlight.
With respect to revising the trend toward greater enclosure via
intellectual property rights, Benkler's argument is that property

123.
On Hobbes as the father of the free-rider problem, see Kavka, supra note 99. On
Schelling and Hume as the fathers of the Convention, see supra note 102.
124.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 380-81.
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rights can get in the way of welfare production via peer production
1 25
because they introduce significant transaction costs.
In a later article, Benkler suggests that there is no default
126
answer as to what is the best property regime for virtual worlds.
He gives the example of the social virtual world of Second Life and
suggests that the participants might themselves be better off in a
situation in which each person did not have ownership in the property
she creates. 127 He sees the situation as akin to Wikipedia or opensource software in the sense that the preferable property-rights
regime may not be the one that allocates maximum property rights to
individuals; to do so might create the sorts of transaction costs that
would make participation less desirable. 128 The objection Benkler is
responding to here is that individual creators are being exploited if
they are not allowed Lockean property rights. 129 Benkler's response in
effect is that a Lockean approach fails because it is not welfare
maximizing. 30 The Lockean approach suggests that participants in
Second Life morally deserve property rights. Benkler says in effect
that they may not want them, as these rights may be contrary to their
best interests.' 3 ' Whatever the correct answer from a top-down
normative perspective, Benkler's view is more consistent with the
manner in which property rights are treated in copyright law in the
United States. In brief, they are not justified in the manner of
fundamental rights like the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of
happiness. Instead, they are justified instrumentally-that is, in
terms of the extent to which they promote social welfare. Benkler's
example of Second Life has the desirable feature that it is plausible to
claim that by the lights of the participants' own welfare calculation,
they do better in the scenario in which they do not possess ownership
rights but the rights are instead held by the corporate creators and
maintainers of Second Life.
An example worth considering in this regard is the socialnetworking site Facebook. 32 First of all, it is of interest to ask
whether social networking sites such as Facebook count as examples

125.
Id. at 375-77.
126.
Benkler, Spoon, supra note 65, at 183-84.
127.
Id.
128.
Id.
129.
For a recent argument that Lockean rights may emerge in virtual worlds, see F.
Gregory Lastowka and Dan Hunter, The Laws of the Virtual Worlds, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1
(2004).
130.
Benkler, Spoon, supra note 65, at 183-84.
131.
Id.
132.
Facebook Home Page, http://www.facebook.com (last visited Mar. 20, 2009).
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of peer production. They would seem to, given that Benkler sees
games such as Ultima Online as examples of peer production. Benkler
even suggests in passing that the Google search engine is a peerproduced good. 13 3 Whereas it is perhaps a tenuous claim that
participation in Wikipedia is fun; with games, any other explanation
would be strained. They are not shared goods of the sort Benkler and
Lessig laud, however. People do not participate because they want to
share or contribute to some common project.134
With socialnetworking sites such as Facebook, one participates because one
wants to. Participants receive a positive "coordination benefit" when
others participate as well.
Facebook has "positive coordination
benefits" in that the more people who are on Facebook, the more it is
in one's interest to be on Facebook. 135
With Facebook, the positive externalities come without any
intent to share or to be part of some common project. This may make
these structures more resilient. A danger expressed about the sharing
model is that it may break down if there is an effort to commercialize
the activity.' 36
For example, Benkler cites this as a possible
explanation for a drop off in participation in Amazon.com by volunteer
discussion moderators. 3 7
By contrast, with Facebook, because
participants do not see themselves as making altruistic contributions,
they will not see themselves as being taken advantage of by nonparticipants. Accordingly, other things equal, their desire to continue
participating will be more steadfast, and thus the peer production
more durable.
One of the key functions of social networks is that everyday
users contribute content. Isn't that what Benkler is interested in-a
social production by peers that produces social welfare due to mass
participation? Unlike Benkler's exemplars, however, social networks
do not appear to even colorably have the structure of tragedies of the
commons, even if one assumes a Hobbesian economic perspective.
Thus, we see that there is nothing in the core notion of peer
production that requires this structure. Benkler's exemplars and sites
such as Facebook share the important feature that they produce
133.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 385.
134.
LESSIG, supra note 11, at 152-54.
135.
See HETCHER, NORMS, supra note 37, at 44.
136.
LESSIG, supra note 11, at 232-33.
137.
Benkler, supra note 2, at 440 ("This is the effect I introduced into the abstract
statement of diverse motivations as the jalt factor-the effect of monetary rewards for
others on the perceived value of participation. One example of such an effect may have
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significant amounts of social welfare, but this is not because they
share a common strategic structure.
A peer production such as Facebook should also be of interest
to Benkler since it exhibits another feature that he highlights with
regard to peer productions-namely, that they occur without the
formal hierarchical structure of firms. 138 As noted earlier, Benkler's
interest is from the perspective of the theory of the firm; he
characterizes peer production as a third type of production lying
conceptually between the two poles in Coase's iconic model-the firm
and the market. 139 The reason it is a separate, third type is that the
production is not provided from within a firm, with its hierarchical
structure and people participating for monetary remuneration. Nor is
the production the result of the workings of the market. Instead,
peers in significant numbers contribute toward the production despite
the fact that the "critical mass of participation in projects cannot be
explained by the direct presence of a command, a price, or even a
future monetary return ... ,"140 The same can be said for Facebook:
users do not post pursuant to a command, price, or future monetary
return, nor is the content they post to the site produced under a strong
hierarchy such as in a firm.
Indeed, I would argue that the
hierarchical structure of production is even more attenuated for
141
Facebook than for open-source software or Wikipedia.
Facebook is not a "common project" or "product," nor does it
aim for a particular outcome. Facebook is more aptly characterized as
a spontaneous order. 142 Facebook raises the question for Benkler's
model as to why it should not count as peer production despite the fact
that it is not a project or product. The fact that Benkler sees peer
138.
Id. at 443.
139.
Id. at 381.
I am not suggesting that peer production will supplant markets or firms. I am
not suggesting that it is always the more efficient model of production for
information and culture. What I am saying is that this emerging third model is

(1) distinct from the other two and (2) has certain systematic advantages over
the other two in identifying and allocating human capital/creativity. When peer
production will surpass the advantages that the other two models may have in
triggering or directing human behavior through the relatively reliable and
reasonably well-understood triggers of money and hierarchy is a matter for more
detailed study.
Id.
140.
Id. at 372.
141.
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at 30-36.
142.
See generally, RONALD HAMONY, THE SCOTTISH ENLIGHTENMENT AND THE
THEORY OF SPONTANEOUS ORDER (1987).
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production in terms of projects and products may come from the fact
that his approach comes through the theory of the firm. 14 3 But if one
takes the term "peer production" literally, it would seem that at a
minimum there must be production of something of social value by
peers. There would seem to be no reason why that something must be
a project or product. Benkler's approach is social welfarist. So in
principle what matters is that peer production promotes social
welfare, which spontaneous orders of groups on Facebook do.
Issues of hierarchy and organization are also interesting in the
context of Facebook. Its organizational hierarchy is not benevolent in
the way that it is for Linux or Wikipedia. Instead, Facebook has
incurred significant public backlash on more than one occasion due to
its efforts to use its participants' information in a manner that raised
serious privacy concerns. 144 This shows that the issue of intellectual
property rights may be more complex in the context of peer production
than is suggested by Benkler's exemplars. Benkler argues elsewhere
that there may be less need for intellectual property rights for
participants in peer productions. 145 In his examples, it is not that
there are no intellectual property rights. Rather, creators cede them
to the foundations behind Linux and Wikipedia. Indeed, it is unlikely
that these foundations could function without control of these rights.
Other examples of peer production, however, involve private
ownership and hence a greater likelihood for the exploitation of these
rights. In the case of Second Life, for example, it may indeed be the
case that people are better off without the individual rights, given the
nature of the peer production. But with Facebook, peer participants
may have good reason to maintain control of the intellectual property
they create and control. 146 Thus, although Benkler says that he
endorses Lessig's notion of keeping the Internet as a commons, 147 we
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now see that the commons is a more complex construct, normatively
speaking, than either of their accounts would suggest.
IV. CONCLUSION
In the foregoing discussion, I followed Benkler's methodological
approach, as I agree that the issues at stake are of such importance
that it is worthwhile to proceed slowly and methodically. Benkler's
account is strictly positive in that he claims that peer production has
the strategic structure of a tragedy of the commons. My equally
positive analysis of this claim was that Benkler was incorrect in his
modeling of peer production, at least with regard to the examples he
discusses. In essence, Benkler's core mistake was to assume that
everything that happens on a commons is subject to potential
tragedy-that is, to widespread free riding of a sort that would be
destructive to valuable social production. As I set out, however,
commons present situations in which different sorts of collectiveaction problems may be present besides the classic tragedy of the
commons.
software and
Indeed, Benkler's exemplars-open-source
Wikipedia-are not, despite initial appearances, tragedies of the
commons, if one follows Benkler in his assumptions regarding the
participants' motivations. These exemplars would appear to the
Hobbesian economist to be free-rider problems, as the economist
would be inclined to wonder why individuals would bother to
contribute when their contributions cost them and do not make the
good any more available to them. But as we saw, if Benkler is correct,
then this first impression would be incorrect. As he notes early on in
the article, the notion of peer production that he employs is derived
from Eben Moglen, who Benkler quoted approvingly as stating, "It's
an emergent property of connected human minds that they create
."148 Though the above discussion
things for one another's pleasure ....
demonstrates that Benkler's account is complex, at the end of the day
it comes down to just this sort of claim: people behave in a way that
results in peer production for just such non-self interested reasons,
although as we saw, Benkler frames these reasons as providing a
circular sort of benefit to the rational actor-the social-psychological
benefit one receives from pleasuring others.
The important point is that according to either the Hobbesian
or Humean economic approach, while there is disagreement over how
best to categorize the social-psychological benefits, there is agreement
148.

Moglen, supra note 118. Benkler, supra note 2 at 380 n.21.
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that not all three of Benkler's types of benefits can be lumped together
as indirect, as the assumptions built into the tragedy of the commons
model depend on the distinction between direct and indirect benefits.
The tragedy of the commons is not solved but dissolved if the
individual's payoff in a single-shot game is to cooperate. If one would
participate in a single-shot game of Wikipedia because it is fun, or one
receives a social-psychological benefit, there is no prisoner's dilemma.
One of the interesting and telling distinctions between
Benkler's paradigm cases of peer production and the paradigm cases
of the tragedy of the commons is that in Benkler's examples, sanctions
play no role.
Participants do not sanction non-participants,
suggesting that the participants do not see themselves as being
exploited by free riders. In other words, they are not participating as
part of an iterated game in which actors conditionally cooperate so
that others will do so as well, and hence take part in sanctioning
defectors in order to engender mutual participation. Thus, the fact
that non-participants are not sanctioned as free riders indicates that
participants have a direct preference to conform. The only senses in
which the preferences are indirect is either in the sense that someone
else in parallel circumstances might prefer to defect (a narrowly selfinterested rational actor), or alternatively, that the participant, were
she to not have the particular social-psychological preferences she has,
would prefer to defect. Once a peer production participant has these
social-psychological preferences, however, they are as direct as any
other preferences. They are not conditional in the manner that the
motives of the narrowly self-interested rational actor in an iterated
prisoner's dilemma are.
Part III of this Article explored the logic of peer production
beyond the bounds set out by Benkler.
I suggested that peer
production, per se, need not exhibit features such as a hierarchical
structure, and the goal need not be to create discrete projects. This is
of interest because it opens up the possibilities for whole new types of
peer production that may promote social welfare but in ways not
envisioned in Benkler's account. The example touched on briefly was
Facebook. As we saw, participation in Facebook does not have the
structure of a prisoner's dilemma. Facebook as a corporate entity does
have a hierarchical structure, but within this broad framework there
is much valuable social creation, collaboration, and interaction taking
place that is more aptly modeled as spontaneous, informal ordering.
Perhaps most significant, Facebook has some 175 million users and
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hence this particular peer production produces social welfare at an
149
extraordinary level.
We saw as well that Facebook raises normative issues not
considered in the context of Benkler's examples.
Benkler is
importantly
right that intellectual property
ownership by
participating peers may indeed impede optimal production of social
welfare. However, a lack of ownership and control of intellectual
property rights by participants may raise normative concerns of a sort
that do not arise in Benkler's example, but do in the context of other
peer production, such as when privacy concerns arise in the context of
Facebook. For Facebook users to have intellectual property rights
would put them in a better position to protect their privacy. Thus, not
every peer production supports the argument for a lower-protectionist
intellectual property regime.
As the epigram to this Article suggested, we are in need of a
theory of collective action for the social world that is emerging in
cyberspace. As the above discussion has indicated, Benkler's theory of
peer production makes an important contribution to this project. The
present Article has sought to expand on Benkler's account by
demonstrating that collective-action problems are not synonymous
with the tragedy of the commons. In particular, one important type of
solution to a collective-action problem of a sort not countenanced by
Benkler is the convention or coordination norm. We saw that not only
would a more comprehensive theory of collective action in cyberspace
need to fit conventions into its account but that even Benkler's
examples of peer production must take account of conventions as well.

149.
See Statistics - Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics
(last visited Mar. 20, 2009) (noting that Facebook has more than 175 million active users).

